






A Discourse on the Soul in Later Islamic Philosophy
Abstract
Despite the significance of later Islamic philosophical tradition, it has remained a neglected 
area of study. In this article, the evolution of the concept of the soul from its Avicennian 
context to post-Avicennian philosophical tradition is discussed. While the author knows 
of no Islamic philosopher who rejected the Peripatetic notion of the soul, post-Avicennian 
philosophers have added much to the discourse on the soul. Beginning with Al-Ghazzālī, we 
see a gradual gnosticization of the concept of the soul that reaches its zenith in the writings 
of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī. Having traced Suhrawardī’s illuminationist (ishrāqī) doctrine 
of the soul, we proceeded to discuss the views of some of the ishrāqī figures on the subject 
matter and then explored how the concept of the soul changed in Mullā Sadrā’s School of 
Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmat	al-Mutiʻalliyah). The article ends with a general over-
view of the modern commentators of later philosophical tradition in Islam and those that 



















































While	 there	 is	 no	 exact	 equivalent	 in	 the	Western	 intellectual	 tradition	 for	
‘Kalām’,	it	can	roughly	be	labeled	‘rational	theology’,	‘scholastic	theology’,	
or	simply	‘fragmented	discourses	pertaining	to	God’.	While	the	intellectual	
foundations	of	kalām	 are	deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	Qur’ān	and	Ḥadīth,	 Islamic	














field	 of	 theology	 useless.	 Despite	 such	 opposition,	 debate	 concerning	 the	
nature	of	the	soul	reached	its	zenith	in	the	9th	century	when	the	rationalist	
Mu‘tazilites	and	their	faith	based	opponents,	the	Ashʻarites,	developed	theo-
ries	 such	 as	Divine	occassionalism	and	 atomism	 to	 explain	 the	nature	 and	
function	of	the	soul.
The	discovery	of	Greek	philosophy,	 and	of	Plato’s	 and	Aristotle’s	work	 in	
particular,	led	to	the	emergence	of	Muslim	Peripatetics	(Mashshā’īs)	 in	the	
9th	and	10th	centuries.	Islamic	philosophy	(falsafah)	effectively	put	an	end	




























ments,	a	hierarchy	of	 souls	came	 to	be	both	 in	 longitudinal	and	 latitudinal	
orders.	Having	divided	the	soul	into	practical	and	theoretical,	Avicenna	tells	
us	that	the	former	is	the	source	of	all	the	bodily	movements,	whereas	the	latter	
performs	 the	more	abstract	 functions.	 In	 the	Aristotelian-Fārābian	 tradition	








similar	 to	 so	many	 other	 Eastern	 and	Western	 philosophers,	 such	 as	Mar-
tin	Heidegger	and	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	became	increasingly	more	esoteric.	
Some	of	Avicenna’s	later	works,	such	as	his	treatise	The Stations of the Gnos-
tics	(Maqāmāt al-‘ārifīn),	Salāmān and Absāl (Salāmān wa Absāl),	and	The 
Flight of Birds (Risālat al-ṭaīr),3	essentially	paved	the	way	for	the	rise	of	a	






























of	the	soul.	Fakhr	al-Dīn	Rāzī,	in	his	work	The Soul, Spirit and Elaboration of 



























tion	(ishrāq).	Also	known	as	Shaykh al-Ishrāq	(the Master of Illumination),	














Suhrawardī,	 in	 his	 magnum opus,	 The Philosophy of Illumination (Ḥikmat 
al-ishrāq),	fully	develops	his	doctrine	of	illumination	and	discusses	the	soul	






















al-ḥūḍūrī),	 in	which	 the	soul	as	an	ontological	 level	of	 reality	 is	a	 type	of	
existence	or	presence	(ḥūḍūr)	which	can	be	more or less. Since	the	soul	 is	
the	essence	of	man,	it	follows	that	humans	also	can be more or less,	and	that	
some	humans	“are” more than others,	 ontologically	 speaking.	Suhrawardī	
advances	three	complex	arguments	as	to	how	the	soul	knows	itself.	While	all	
three	are	slightly	different,	they	are	renditions	of	the	following	argument.	In	
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The	 theory	 of	 “Knowledge	by	Presence”	 that	 became	 the	modus operandi 




that	practical	wisdom	 is	 a	 component	of	utilizing	 the	 function	of	 the	 soul,	
Suhrawardī	reminds	us:










see	 how	 the	 soul	 is	 treated	 by	 philosopher-mystics	who	 themselves	wrote	












losopher,	 scientist,	 and	mystic	 (1236	CE)	who	wrote	 a	major	 commentary	
on	Suhrawardī’s	Philosophy of Illumination.	 In	 his	 other	major	work,	The 


















































perfection	 and	 an	ontological	 level	 of	 reality	 inevitably	became	associated	
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Shaykh al-Akbar	 (the	 Great	 Master),	 of	 philosophical	 Gnosticism	 of	 this	
era,	on	the	soul	is	beyond	the	scope	of	our	work,	however,	his	influence	on	
later	 Islamic	philosophy,	 especially	 in	 the	Persianate	world,	merits	 a	brief	












which	are	Sparks of Light	(Jadhawāt),	The Clear Horizon (Ufuq al-mubīn),	












“In	the path of those who unveil and witness [the truth]
The world is not but reflections upon existence






the	Divine	sages).	 It	 is	with	Mullā	Ṣadrā	 that	 the	philosophico-gnostic	dis-
course	on	the	concepts	of	existence	and	soul	reaches	a	new	high	in	Islamic	
philosophy.





















and	the	same.	In	his	work	entitled	The Unification of the Intellector and the 
Intellected (Ittiḥād al-‘āqil wa’l-ma‘qūl)	Mullā	Ṣadrā	investigates	the	ques-
tion	of	unity	between	 the	 intellector	 and	 the	 intellected.	This	 theory,	 often	
known	as	 the	“Unity	of	 the	Knower	and	the	Known”,	maintains	 that	when	
the	soul	as	 the	knower	reflects	upon	God	as	 the	object	of	knowledge,	 they	
become	one	and	the	same.
Mullā	Ṣadrā,	in	his	famous	phrase	“jismāniyyāt al-ḥudūth wa ruḥāniyyāt al-




Ibn	 ʻArabī,	 “The	 Divine	 Roots	 of	 Human	
Love”	 [Futūḥāt],	 trans.	by	William	C.	Chit-
tick,	 Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi 




Mullā	Ṣadrā, Al-Asfār al-ʽaqliyyah al-arba‘ah 














in	his	The Four Intellectual Journeys and	the	Wisdom of the Throne,20	Mullā	
Ṣadrā	tells	us	that	the	soul	goes	through	various	stages	of	development.	The 
Four Intellectual Journeys depicts	 the journey	of	 the	soul	from	God	to	 the	






















‘Abd	al-Razzāq	Lāhījī	and	his	works	The Pearl of Desire	(Gowhar-i murād)	




rich	commentaries	on	 the	 function	and	place	of	 the	soul	both	 in	prose	and	
poetry.	An	example	of	the	genre	that	philosophers	of	this	period	produced	can	
be	found	in	Mullā	Rajab	‘Alī	Tabrizī,	the	philosopher,	theologian,	mystic	and	







ten	 in	Persian	and	entitled	Reflection of the Archetype of Purity in Refuta-


































The	word	 used	 by	Mullā	Ṣadrā	 is	 ‘jawhar’,	
which	 although	 is	 often	 translated	 as	 ‘sub-
stance’,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	Aristotle’s	
use	of	the	word	‘substance’.	‘Jawhar’,	as	used	
by	Mullā	Ṣadrā	is	much	the	same	as	‘essence’,	
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[Hidden Words]	 and	al-Ma‘ārif al-ilāhiyyah 
[Divine Sciences],	 Qāḍī	 Sa‘id	 Qummī’s	
Asrār al-‘ibādāt [Mysteries of Worship]	 and	
Ta‘liqāt bar uthūlūjiyāˊ [Commentary on the 
“Enneads”], and	 the	 greatest	master	 of	 this	
period,	Ḥajjī	Mullā	Hādī	Sabziwārī,	with	his 
Sharḥ al-manẓumah [Commentary on a Philo-
sophical Poem],	as	well	as	Mullā	‘Abd	Allah	









of	the	5th	century	argues	in	his	work	How Substances Can Be Good in Virtue 
of Their Existence without Being Absolute Goods. He	tells	us:
“Everything	that	is	participates	in	absolute	Being	through	the	fact	that	it	exists.”26





















Rasprava o duši u kasnijoj islamskoj filozofiji
Sažetak
Usprkos značaju kasnije islamske filozofske tradicije, ona je ostala zanemarenim područjem 
proučavanja. U ovome članku raspravlja se o razvoju koncepta duše iz njezina avicennijan-
skog konteksta prema post-avicennijanskoj filozofskoj tradiciji. I dok autor ne zna niti jednog 
islamskog filozofa koji je odbacivao peripatetički pojam duše, post-avicennijanski filozofi do-
dali su puno toga raspravi o duši. Započinjući s al-Ghazzālījem, uviđamo postupnu gnostici-
zaciju koncepta duše, koja doseže svoj vrhunac u djelima Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardīja. Idući 
tragom Suhrawardījeva iluminacionističkog (ishrāqī) učenja o duši, nastavljamo s raspravom o 
stajalištima nekih ishrāqī figura o ovoj problematici i potom istražujemo kako se koncept duše 
promijenio u Mullā Sadrāovoj školi transcendentne filozofije (al-Ḥikmat	al-Mutiʻalliyah). Čla-
nak završava općenitim pregledom modernih komentatora kasnije filozofske tradicije u islamu i 










Diskurs über die Seele in der späteren islamischen Philosophie
Zusammenfassung
Trotz der Signifikanz der späteren islamischen philosophischen Tradition blieb sie ein vernach-
lässigter Studienbereich. In diesem Beitrag wird die Evolution des Seelenkonzepts von seinem 
avicennischen Kontext bis hin zur postavicennischen philosophischen Tradition erörtert. Wäh-
rend der Autor keinen islamischen Philosophen kennt, der die peripatetische Vorstellung von 
der Seele verwarf, haben die postavicennischen Philosophen dem Diskurs über die Seele vieles 
hinzugefügt. Beginnend mit Al-Ghazālī sehen wir eine allmähliche Gnostisierung des Konzepts 
der Seele ein, die ihren Zenit in den Schriften von Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī erreicht. Nachdem 
wir Suhrawardīs illuminationistische (ishrāqī) Lehre von der Seele verfolgt haben, beginnen wir, 
die Standpunkte einiger der ishrāqī-Figuren zu diesem Gegenstand zu diskutieren und anschlie-
ßend zu erforschen, wie sich das Konzept der Seele in Mullā Sadrās Schule der Transzendental-
philosophie (al-Ḥikmat	al-Mutiʻalliyah) geändert hat. Der Beitrag endet mit einem allgemeinen 
Überblick über die modernen Kommentatoren der späteren philosophischen Tradition im Islam 
und über diejenigen, die einflussreich in der Gestaltung der Evolution des Konzepts der Seele 






Le discours sur l’âme dans la philosophie islamique tardive
Résumé
Malgré son importance, la philosophie islamique tardive est restée un domaine d’étude négligé. 
Dans cet article, le développement du concept d’âme a été discuté à partir du contexte philo-
sophique d’Avicenne et s’étend jusqu’à la tradition philosophique post-avicennienne. Tandis 
qu’aucun philosophe islamique n’a rejeté le concept péripatéticien de l’âme – à la connaissance 
de l’auteur –, les philosophes post-avicenniens ont amené leur contribution au débat sur l’âme. 
En commençant par al-Ghazâlî, nous remarquons une gnosticisation graduelle du concept 
d’âme qui atteint son paroxysme dans les œuvres de Shahab al-Din Sohrawardi. En	suivant	la	
trace	de	l’enseignement	illuminationiste (ishrāqī) sur l’âme de Sohrawardi, nous poursuivons 
la discussion en abordant les points de vue de certaines figures ishrāqī sur la problématique, 
pour ensuite nous pencher sur l’évolution du concept d’âme dans l’école de la philosophie 
transcendante (al-Ḥikmat	al-Mutiʻalliyah) de Mollâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî. L’article se termine par une 
étude générale des commentateurs modernes de la tradition philosophique tardive en islam et 
s’intéresse aussi à ceux qui ont été influents dans la formation du développement du concept 
d’âme dans le monde moderne.
Mots-clés
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